Browsing by Author "Choe, Chongwoo"

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Modelling addicitive consumption: Some theoretical and econometric issues
    (1997-06) Choe, Chongwoo; Moosa, Imad A
    This paper addresses some theoretical and econometric aspects of modelling addictive consumption. We show that the solution to the optimization problem leads to a specification of the reduced from equation which is different from what is found in the literature. We also demonstrate that it is valid to apply OLS to estimate this reduced from equation and those used in the literature although the underlying variables are integrated.
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    Schools of economic and commerce: Incentive to work vs disincentive to invest: the case of chaina's rural reform 1979-1984
    (1995-02) Choe, Chongwoo
    An institutional change from the communal system to the household responsibility system in rural chaina has brought a bout dramatic increase in productivity during the period of 1978-1985,but has also opend up a set of new problems decreased investment among others. I argue in this paper that the new responsibility system is effective to peasants by rendering residual claims but not so in internalizing positive externalities of investment resulting in the underinvestment . Agricultural subsidy investment tax credit the roles of such institutions as township and village enterprises in undertaking the investment in agricultural infrastructure and most fundamentally well-established property rights are discussed as possible remedies.
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    Schools of economics and commerce: Compliance monitoring and agri-environmental policy
    (1977-05) Choe, Chongwoo; Fraser, Lain
    This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non) compliance. With a risk neutral farmer and optimal policy involves maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance. Such an extreme payment scheme contributes to reducing monitoring costs.With a risk-averse farmer the environmental agency has to weigh risk-bearing costs against monitoring costs. Unlike previous studies it is shown that depending on parameter values optimal monitoring accurancy may or may not be higher with a risk-averse farmer than with a risk-neutral farmer
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    Two comments on the industrial organisation of vertically related markets
    (1998-03) Choe, Chongwoo
    This paper studies the determination of final consumer price when two successive monopolist bargain over the intermediate goods price. Unlike the conventional double marginalization result which rests on the (implicit) assumption that the upstream firm has all the bargaining power, it is shown that, as the bargaining power shifts from downstream firm to upstream firm the equilibrium quantity (price) decreases (increases) continuously from the vertically integrated outcome to the conventional double marginalization outcome. This paper next studies the determination of retail and wholesale prices in successive court oligopolies and geueralizes the results of Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) on the ratio of tetial to wholesale margins in successive monopolies.