Schools of economics and commerce: Compliance monitoring and agri-environmental policy

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dc.contributor.authorChoe, Chongwoo
dc.contributor.authorFraser, Lain
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-04T05:27:15Z
dc.date.available2022-03-04T05:27:15Z
dc.date.issued1977-05
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non) compliance. With a risk neutral farmer and optimal policy involves maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance. Such an extreme payment scheme contributes to reducing monitoring costs.With a risk-averse farmer the environmental agency has to weigh risk-bearing costs against monitoring costs. Unlike previous studies it is shown that depending on parameter values optimal monitoring accurancy may or may not be higher with a risk-averse farmer than with a risk-neutral farmeren_US
dc.identifier.isbn186446142 X
dc.identifier.urihttp://econspace.ips.lk/handle/789/452
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectCompliance Monitoring, Agri-Environmental policyen_US
dc.titleSchools of economics and commerce: Compliance monitoring and agri-environmental policyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
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